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ABSTRACT
Allegory and Nietzschean Values
in Kafka, Camus and Kazantzakis
by
Paul Kenneth Naylor
Master of Arts
Utah State University, 1981
Major Professor:
Department:

Eugene Washington

English

The purpose of this thesis is to explore Nietzschean
values as they appear in three modern allegories:

Franz

Kafka's The Castle, Albert Camus' The Plague, and Nikos
Kazantzakis' Zorba the Greek.

The intent is to illustrate

Friedrich Nietzsche's three stages of the overman as they
apply to Kafka, Camus, and Kazantzakis.
(91 pages)

INTRODUCTION
Why does man value what he values?

In one form or

another, this apparently simple question has haunted and
provoked my thinking for the last six years--leading me to
wander into the labyrinths of theology, philosophy, and
literature in hope of finding a cogent, satisfying answer.
I soon learned that labyrinths frustrated me the most when
I felt I had somewhere to go, somewhere beyond the laby
rinth--like "heaven" or "truth."

I also learned it is all

too easy to overlook the beauty of the labyrinth itself when
I focused my energy and value on something outside the maze.
Unlike. Theseus--who was given only one thread by Ariadne
to lead him through Minos' labyrinth--I have two threads
guiding and focusing me on a path through this thesis, my
present labyrinth:

Angus Fletcher's theory of allegory and

Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy of value.

Fletcher taught

me that allegory fuses together art and philosophy into a
mode of expression which often transcends both disciplines.
Nietzsche taught me, above all, that we should seek to
understand this labyrinth-like world for what it really
is--a labyrinth--and, then, embrace every part of it.

My

intention is to wind these two threads, allegory and value,
into one by examining the value systems in allegorical lit
erature, concentrating on modern works directly influenced by
Nietzsche's allegory, Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
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Chapter One of this thesis is a definition of my first
thread, allegory.
genre, Allegory:

Based on Fletcher's seminal work on the
The Theory of a Symbolic Mode, it sets up

the criteria for determining if a work of literature is an
allegory or not.

By emphasizing the double intention of

allegory, the daemonic, allegorical agent, and the cosmic,
allegorical image, we can then apply these three specific
aspects to the allegories treated in Chapters Two through
Four.
Chapter Two--my second thread--is a comparative study
of two distinct views of value, the Christian and the Exis
tential value systems.

In The Faerie QueenQ, Edmund Spenser

straps the values of renaissance Christianity on his charac
ters for the same reason Icarus straps on his waxen wings:
they both concentrate their energy on getting out of the
labyrinth--this world--because their values remain outside
the walls of the maze.
fallen to earth:

Nietzsche's Zarathustra is Icarus

he concentrates his energy on exploring,

fighting, and, finally, embracing the labyrinth.

Spenser's

Christian value system provides the necessary foil, while
Nietzsche's Existential value system provides the essential
pattern for the study of modern allegorical literature in
the final two chapters of this thesis.
Chapters Three and Four weave the two threads through
three examples of modern allegorical literature:

Franz

Kafka's The Castle, Albert Camus' The Plague, and Nikos
Kazantzakis' Zorba The Greek.

The first thread, allegory,

3
supplies the criteria for determining if the three novels are
allegorical works.

Nietzsche's philosophy of value, my second

thread, supplies an interpretive pattern--the three stages of
development his overman must pass through--which I apply to
the novels in the fourth, and final, chapter of this thesis.
To claim that the primary motive of Kafka, Camus, and
Kazantakis in writing their respective allegories was their
desire to portray a definite stage of Nietzsche's overman
would greatly over-simplify three richly diverse novels.
I contend, however, that all three writers were greatly
affected by Nietzsche's philosophy, and that they all had
Nietzsche's central question in their mind when they wrote
their allegories:

what is man to do when he realizes that

the labyrinth is all there is?

4

CHAPTER I
A DEFINITION OF ALLEGORY

-- Allego��e-0 ake na� le-0/2 onten the dull
-0y-0tem-0 that they ake keputed to be than
they ake -0ymbol�c powe� -0t�uggle-0. -Angus Fletcher

Allegory, as Angus Fletcher so incisively put it, is a
"protean device,"

1

able to change its shape and form without

losing the essential aspects which constitute allegorical
literature.

Allegory is such an eclectic mode of expression

that defining it is about as easy as catching a fly with a
pair of forceps--but there are certain conventions which allow
the reader to determine if a work is allegorical or not.

The

central reason for allegory's eclectic nature is that form is
not one of the conventions:

allegory appears in all genres of

literature, from epic to lyric to romance to drama.

Without a

formal criteria for allegory, the critic is forced to rely on
the content and intention of the work if he is to determine if
it is an example of allegorical fiction.

Although the defini

tion of allegory in this chapter mainly concerns the content
and intention of the mode, a discussion of the etymology and
history of the term is necessary to understand fully the
nature of allegory as it appears in literature.
Etymology and History of the Term
The term allegory compounds two Greek words:

allos,

which means other, and agoreuin, which means to speak openly
in the assembly or marketplace.

By prefixing agoreuin with

allos, the sense of the word is inverted; therefore, allegory
means to speak other than openly or "speaking otherwise that
one seems to speak."

2

The connotative use of the word is to

6
speak of one subject in terms of another;

this nuance of the

word is essential because allegory relies so heavily on
double intention, which I will discuss later in this chapter.
The first critical treatment of the term allegory appears
in 46 B.C., in Cicero's Orator:
When there is a continuous stream of metaphors,
a wholly different style of speech is producedr
. "allegory."
consequently the Greeks call it .
They are right as to the name, but from the point
of view of classification Aristotle does better
in calling them metaphors. 3
This statement lays the foundation for the traditional definition of allegory as an extended metaphor.

If metaphor is a

comparative ''transfer" of meaning between two unlike classes,
usually movi�g between the concrete and abstract levels,
then the assertion that allegory is a continuous metaphor
extended throughout a given work is not only justified but
essential to any definition of all0gory.
Quintilian, the next rhetorician to discuss the term,
accepts Cicero's definition as fundamentally true, but he
expands on this foundation by adding the essential point
that "Allegory . . . either presents one thing in words and
another in meaning, or else something absolutely opposed to
the meaning of the words.

11

4

Quintilian recognized the im

plied, connotative meaning of the term (that it very often
says one thing while meaning another), an insight that takes
into account both the double intention and the use of irony
in allegorical literature.

7

Cicero's and Quintilian's classical definition of alle
gory as an extended metaphor remained virtually unquestioned
throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, not receiving
much attention until the Romantic period and Samuel Taylor
Coleridge.

Although Coleridge does not disagree with the

traditional definition of allegory, his expansion (and judg
ment) of the term set the tone for most of the criticism to
follow:
We may then safely define allegorical writing as
the employment of one set of agents and images
with actions and accompaniments correspondent, so as
to convey, while in disguise, either moral qualities
or conceptions of the mind that are not in them
selves objects of the senses, or other images,
agents, actions, fortunes, and circumstances so
that the difference is everywhere presented to the
eye or imagination, while the likeness is suggested
to the mind; and this connectedly, so that the
parts combine to form a consistent whole. 5
Three aspects of Coleridge's definition merit attention:
first, the idea that a set of images and agents will corre
spond to a parallel set of abstractions of the mind; secondly,
that this correspondence will express a moral or philosophical
value system; and finally, that all the separate parts of the
work will "combine to form a consistent whole."
Although Coleridge's definition of the term raises few
problems, his judgment that symbolic writing is preferable
to allegorical writing has given the genre of allegory more
6
notoriety than it deserves.

This judgment is based on his

decision to value art that flows uninhibited from the uncon
scious over art that is filtered through the mental faculties.

8

Many contemporary critics--Frye, Honig, and Fletcher parti
cularly--have pointed out that Coleridge's decision is a value
judgment based on taste rather than critical insight, but
his opinion influenced many of his contemporaries to assume
that allegorical writing was inferior to symbolic writing.
This prejudice became so entrenched that the genre received
little of its deserved treatment--causing many fine, modern
works not to be recognized and appreciated as allegories,
something this thesis seeks to remedy.
One major, modern critic who has not slighted allegory
is Northrup Frye.

His brief yet lucid entry on the topic

in The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics is one
of the best general descriptions of allegory:
We have allegory when the events of a narrative
obviously and continuously refer to another simul
taneous structure of events or ideas, whether
historical events, moral or philosophical ideas,
or natural phenomena.7
Again, the emphasis on the double intention of allegory, the
narrative and the ideal level, is the central point of concern
here.

When a critic of Frye's stature devotes as much of his

thought and praise to allegory as Frye has, the door for a
more thorough treatment of the genre is wide open:
Fletcher's seminal work Allegory:

Angus

The Theory of� Symbolic

Mode is just such a treatment, easily the most incisive and
insightful exploration of the subject to date.
Most critics prior to Fletcher have been content with
providing a general, abstract definition of allegory with-

9
out a thorough analysis of the particular elements of the
mode, but Fletcher moves beyond these somewhat superficial
definitions by ferreting out the individual aspects that
comprise allegorical literature.

His analysis of the content

of allegory provides a solid, in-depth foundation for deter
mining if a given work can be considered an allegory.
The Content of Allegory
For the most part, Fletcher accepts the traditional
definition of allegory as an extended metaphor, but he uses
Coleridge's definition as his springboard, devoting a sepa
rate chapter of his book to an analysis of the five elements
of allegory that Coleridge mentions:
fortunes, and circumstances.

images, agents, actions,

Fletcher adds an essential

qualifying point to the traditional definition:
. no "pure Allegory" will ever be found.
There is therefore no harm in drawing instances
from borderline cases. Even The Divine Comedy,
which most readers would assume to be the great
est Western example of allegory, seemed to Cole
ridge, and has more recently been shown by
Auerbach, to be quasi-allegorical work. With such
a major example in mind one cannot help wondering
if borderline cases are not going to be the norm. 8
Fletcher first takes up the question of the nature of
the agents (or characters/ in allegorical literature.

He

asserts that the major distinguishing mark of an allegorical
agent is that it is daemonic:
Daemons, as I shall define them, share the major
characteristic of allegorical agents, the fact
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that they compartmentalize function. If we were
to meet an allegorical character in real life, we
would say of him that he was obsessed with only
one idea, or that he had an absolutely one-track
mind, or that his life was patterned according to
absolutely rigid habits from which he never allowed
himself to vary.9
The three main points here are that allegorical agents "com
partmentalize function," that they are "obsessed with only
one idea," and that their lives are "patterned according to
absolutely rigid habits."
To understand what Fletcher means by "compartmentalize
function," we need to examine his definition of daemon, which
is based on Schnewies' Angels and Demons.
daemon as:

Fletcher defines

"Coming from the term that means to 'divide,'

daemon impli�s an endless series of divisions of all the im
portant aspects of the world into separate elements for study
and control.11

10

If the daemonic agent divides his world

into "endless divisions" and treats the events in his world
accordingly, then his function as an agent will be compart
mentalized in the sense that his goal will be segmented into
some type of hierarchy:

the "endless divisions" and stages

in Dante's spiritual journey are the most obvious examples.
Portraying the allegorical agent as being obsessed with
a single idea is a necessary component of allegory if the
author is to represent an abstract principle through his
character, which is one of the main intentions of allegory.
The author of an allegory is usually concerned with making
one moral or philosophical point, and his main character will

11

share that same concern:

Dante's concern with �the state of

souls after death," Spenser's intention of fashioning a "gen
tleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline,"
Melville's "overwhelming idea of the whale," Nietzsche's
"overman," and Kafka's "urgent wish .

. to get my business

with the authorities properly settled" are all excellent
examples of this daemonic obsession with a single idea.

One

quality of the ideals that obsess allegorical agents is that
they all have an "impossible desire to become one with an
image of unchanging purity.11

11

Whether it is Dante's Para

diso, Spenser's Court of Gloriana, Nietzsche's Day of the
Overman, or Kafka's Distant Castle, the agents are all
striving for an ideal that is outside of their grasp in this
life.
Fletcher contends that when a person is obsessed by an
abstract ideal it will be expressed in ritualistic behavior,
characterized by a life ruled by "rigid habits."

These

rituals and habits vary according to the constraints of the
ideal, but they all have the same effect:

-

-

"it would seem

that he Lthe character_! was driven by some hidden, private
force .
destiny .

. it would appear that he did not control his own
.,12

Because the agent is ruled by an ideal,

his actions will be determined by his attitude towards the
rules of the ritual, so his behavior will seem somewhat me
chanical:

Dante's actions are prescribed by the hierarchy

of his journey; Spenser's knights are controlled by Provi
dence; Kafka's "K." is bound by the regulations of the Castle;

12
and the repetitive, ritualistic plague treatments and checks
in Camus' The Plague are all situations and circumstances when
the agent is compelled to express his reaction towards the
ideal through ritualistic and mechanistic actions.
Because the allegorical agent compartmentalizes function,
is obsessed with one idea, and is controlled by rigid habits,
he will appear to be a "flat" or "two-dimensional" figure,
more of a caricature than a "real," fully developed character.
Furthermore, Fletcher asserts that· "agency becomes confused
with imagery, and action becomes a diagram 11 j

13

therefore, the

imagery that an author surrounds his agents with will be in
dicative of both the nature of the character and the nature
of the ideal in an allegorical work.
Fletcher bases his description of allegorical imagery
on the Greek conception of Kosmos; he argues that "Kosmos
has a double meaning, since it denotes both a large-scale
order (macrocosmos; and the small-scale sign of that order
14
(microcosmos) .1 1

This double function of the cosmic image

is perfectly suited for allegory since the essence of the
mode is the parallel development of the ideal (macrocosmic
leve 1) and the narrative (microcosmic leve 1) •
For an image to be considered an example of Kosmos, ac
cording to Fletcher, it must exhibit the following characteristics:
First, it must imply a systematic part-whole re
lationship; second, it should be capable of in
cluding "personifications'.;.,-; fourth, it should
suggest the daemonic nature of the image; fifth,

13
it should allow an emphasis on the visual modality,
specifically on visual or symbolic "isolation,"
not to say surrealism; finally, it sh ould be such
t hat large-scale double meanings would emerge if
it were combined with other such images.15
Since t he

th ird

and fourth characteristics

h ave

been examined,

the first, second, fifth, and sixth are the most important
elements to be considered regarding the nature of cosmic,
allegorical imagery.
If t he cosmic image includes both the microcosm and

t he

macrocosm, t hen Fletcher�s first two character istics-- that
it imply a part-whole relationship and that it be capable of
metonymy and synecdoche--will naturally appear in allegorical
imagery.

Since the cosmic image must serve the double function

of referring_simultaneously to both levels of meaning, there
must be a "symbiosis of par t and whole .

•

•

. The whole may

de termine t he sense of the parts, and the parts be governed
by the intention of t he whole": 16
as synecdoche.

T his re lationship is known

"Behold, the steers/ Bring back the plough

suspended f rom the yoke," is the example Quintilian gives of
synecdoche.

17

Metonymy. which occurs when one word is sub-

stituted for another bearing a close relationsh ip, is very
common in allegory because of t he necessity of
symbol with that which it symbolizes.
vious

example

e quating

th e

Perhaps t he most ob

of this is the naming of allegorical characters:

Spenser 's "Red Crosse Knight," Nietzsche's "Zarathustra," and
even Kafka's "K." are examples of metonymic substitution.
The key term in Fletcher's fifth characteristic of an

14
allegorical image is "isolation."

Visually, allegories will

"present bits and pieces of allegorical 'machinery,' scales
of justice, magic mirrors, crystal balls .

. These devices

are places on the picture plane without any clear location
in depth. 11

18

Fletcher distinguishes between three types of

cosmic, isolated images:

the first is the talisman, which is

a source of power or magic for the agent (Zarathustra's eagle
and serpent); the second is the insignia or banner (Red Crosse
Knight's red cross); and the third is astral symbolism ("It
19

is the stars, / The stars above us, govern our conditions 11

).

If the cosmic image is isolated from normal situations
and contexts, then it is essentially a non-mimetic mode of
expression, ieading the reader to treat the work in an ab
stract, interpretive manner which results in Fletcher's final
characteristic of cosmic imagery:
scale double meanings.

the emergence of large-

These large-scale, macrocosmic mean

ings--conveyed through the cosmic image--are the moral,
ethical, and philosophical ideals that constitute the content
of allegorical literature, and they also provide the reader
with insight concerning the author's intention and purpose
in writing allegories.
The Intention of Allegory
Why write an allegory?

Keeping in mind that allegory

is admittedly non-mimetic and Coleridge's judgment that
allegory is inferior to pure symbolism, why would an author

15
choose this ambivalently received mode to express his art?
Fletcher argues that "The price of a lack of mim tic natural
ness is what the allegorist • . . must pay in order to force
his reader into an analytical frame of mind.11

20

If this is

correct, then the purpose of the daemonic agent and the iso
lated cosmic image is to cause an intellectual, interpretive
response in the reader, bringing us back to Coleridge's
"disjunction of the faculties."

Coleridge declared allegory

inferior because he disliked this disjunction; to others, it
is one of the most appealing aspects of literature:
boils down to a matter of taste.

it all

Fletcher takes both points

of view into account in his final appraisal of the purpose
and intention of allegory:
In a word, I suspect they are the monuments to our
ideals. They do not mimetically show us the human
beings who need these ideals, but they examine the
philosophic, theological, or moral premises on
which we act, and then they confront us with the
perfection of certain ideals, the depravity of
others. 2 1
Since the author seeks to "force his reader into an
analytical frame of mind," then his pimary intention would
be, as Fletcher said, to "examine the philosophic, theological,
or moral premises on which we act," leaving the narrative
or plot level as secondary in intention.

Even though the

best allegories can be appreciated solely for the ornamental
beauty of their narrative level, the primary intention of
the author is to present a system of ideals, which reveals

16
itself

in the use of the daemonic agent and the isolated cos

mic image.

The allegorical agent and image act as catalysts, forcing
the reader into "an analytical frame of mind."

The allegorist

will then "confront us with the perfection of certain ideals,
the depravity of others."

Fletcher's statement clearly places

allegory in the category of epideictic rhetoric, which is
rhetoric in either praise or blame of something; therefore, we
can expand the scope of the intention of allegory to include
both the didactic and persuasive functions.

If the primary

intention of allegory is to present a system of ideals and
values, then the author would naturally use a didactic tone.
Allegories are persuasive because they "raise questions of
value directly, by asserting certain propositions as good
and others as bad,11
his system.

22

and the author intends for us to accept

These systems are traditionally dualistic in

essence, so the author uses the tensions between good and
evil, heaven and hell, health and sickness (among others) as
persuasive tools to convince us to embrace his particular
hierarchy of ideals and values.
Edwin Honig-·in his excellent book on the genesis of
allegory, Dark Conceit--captures the essence of the intention
of allegory when he states that the allegorist "attempts to
•
•
11 2 3
f rame an 1• dea 1 that defines
• hest aspirations.
•
an age I s h 1g
The focus of this thesis is on the primary intention of alle
gory, which is to express, through literary expertise, the
inherent value system of a given age.

By studying the value

systems of a culture, we begin to discover the diverse and
manifold ways man seeks to explain the labyrinth to himself.
The next chapter compares two different and opposing value
systems--the traditional "Christian" system and the modern
"Existential" system--by exploring the expressed ideals in
Spenser's The Faerie Queene and Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zara
thustra which give meaning to the aspirations of the people
and society they represent.
stage:

Zarathustra's words set the

"Through esteeming alone is there value:

and with-

out esteeming, the nut of existence would be hollow.11

24

Through allegory, we can make a "pleasing analysis" of what
man esteems.
of culture.

Through allegory, we can feel the value-pulse

18

CHAPTER II
ALLEGORY AND VALUE IN
SPENSER AND NIETZSCHE

-- Once one /2a�d God when one ioo�ed upon
d�/2tant /2ea/2; but now I have taught you
to /2ay: ovekman. God �-0 a conjectuke,
but I de-0�ke that youk conjectu�e/2 �hould
not keach beyond youk ckeat�ve w�ll. -Nietzsche's Zarathustra

19

Allegory in "The Faerie Queene"
Edmund Spenser laid to rest any serious debate concern
ing the allegorical nature of The Faerie Queene by explicitly
stating in his prefatory letter to Raleigh that the poem is
"a continued Allegory, or darke conceit."

Still, it is im

portant to analyze The Faerie Queene according to the defini
tion of Chapter One to establish a solid foundation for com
paring and contrasting the other allegories in this thesis.
Spenser also leaves no doubt that his primary intention
is to "examine the philosophic, theological, or moral premises
on which we act."

In the same letter to Raleigh, Spenser

states:
The generall end therefore of all the booke is to
fasion a gentleman or noble person in vertuous
and gentle disipline: .
. perfected in the twelve
private morall vertues, as Aristotle hath devised,
the which is the purpose of these first twelve
bookes.25
This letter also indicates that Spenser's main charac
ters are daemonic because they represent and are obsessed with
one idea.

Spenser makes it clear that he means the Queene to

represent both glory and Elizabeth, that Arthur represents
magnificence (which is all twelve virtues combined), that
Redcrosse represents holiness, Guyon temperance, and Brito
martis chastity.

He also sets up daemonic foil characters

which represent the evil opposition of his heroes:

Redcrosse

battles with Archimago and Duessa, Guyon with Mammon and

20
Acrasia, and Britomartis with Argante and Ollyphant.
As pointed out in the previous chapter, when characters
are daemonic, they tend to be flat or two-dimensional, causing
them to appear as nearly static images--cosmic images.

Spen

ser's characters and images fit Fletcher's six-fold defini
tion of cosmic imagery; the first four points are fulfilled
by the ability of the agents and images to function on the
two levels necessary for allegory.
Fletcher's fifth characteristic of the cosmic image is
that it is "isolated."

Spenser uses the device of the talis

man with most of his major agents:
and Guyon has his Palmer.

Redcrosse has his armour

The best example of the insignia

or banner as a cosmic image is the red cross of the Redcrosse
Knight; the magical power of his cross saves him more than
once in The Faerie Queene.

Spenser also relies heavily on

astral symbolism, the third characteristic of an isolated
image, throughout his poem so that his characters can "read
aright/ The course of heavenly cause.

11 26

The sixth characteristic of a cosmic image, that it
''should be such that large-scale double meanings would emerge,"
leads back to the central distinction of all allegories:

they

function on both the ideal and narrative level simultaneously,
and Spenser's poem easily fits this and all the other charac
teristics of allegorical literature.
With the issue of the allegorical nature of The Faerie
Queene settled, we can now explore the expressed ideals of
the Christian value system in Spenser's poem.

21
Spenser and the Christian Value System
As Edmund Spenser wrote The Faerie Queene, the sixteenth
century came to its close and the Christian value system
reached its apex.

Spenser fused the essentially Christian

values of the renaissance and the reformation together in
his allegorical masterpiece by combining the renaissance image
of the courtly gentleman with the reformation doctrines of
John Calvin.

In doing this, he defined his "age's highest

aspirations." Spenser's value system in The Faerie Queene
revolves around three main axioms of Judeo/Christian thought:
1)

There exists a God--omnipotent, providential,

teleological--who assigns an external, extrinsic
value to all things; an entity has value by virtue
of its relation to this deity and its chosen, predestined course.
2)

If value is determined by God, then actions

which adhere to God's design are GOOD; actions
which oppose this design are EVIL:

dualism is

the essential nature of reality in the Christian
world view.
31

Man's course is then set for him:

to choose

either good or evil, to say either yes or no.
Man's purpose, his meaning, is to live in the
present in a way which will insure his fate in
the future, which is the "other world," which is
of more value than the "present, apparent world."
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There exists a God:

this presupposition is the founda

tion of all Judeo/Christian thought.

All subsequent premises

of this system flow directly from it:
Well did Antiquitie a God thee deeme,
That over mortall minds hast so great might,
To order them as best to thee doth seeme,
And all their actions to direct aright;
The fatall purpose of divine foresight,
Thou doest effect in destined descents,
Through deepe impression of thy secret might,
Which the late world adrnyres for wonderous moniment.27
Spenser asserts that God possesses great and secret might
(omnipotence) through which he inspires and directs man to
high intents, consisting of doing God's will and God's will
alone.

With this omnipotence, God designs his predetermined

plan for his.creation, which is "The fatall purpose of divine
foresight."

Since Spenser wrote within the Calvinistic frame

work of predestination and determinism, it is natural that he
would portray God as the director and instigator of all men's
actions.
Since God is doing the planning, he necessarily assigns
value to all entities within his system "as best to thee doth
seeme."

If value is assigned from a source outside and ex

ternal to the entity--from outside the labyrinth--then it is
an extrinsic value system rather than an intrinsic system,
which is one of the main qualities of the existential value
system.

In an intrinsic system an entity has value in and of

itself instead of receiving its value from outside of itself.
If value is assigned extrinsically, then entities within
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the system, in the case of The Faerie Queene, derive their
value by virtue of their relation to the value judgments of
the assigner, God.

The renaissance Christianity of Spenser

illustrates how his culture perceived God's value judgments
in relation to themselves and the world around them.
Arthur says "Fu 11 hard it is .

When

. to read aright/ The course

of heavenly cause, or understand/ The secret meaning of th'
eternal might/ That rules mens ways, and rules the thoughts
of living wight, 11
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spenser gives his quintessential evalua

tion of man's situation in his culture:

to read from the

heavens the value judgments of God that rule men's ways and,
then, adhere to them.

His sole task is to accept or reject

the value judgments of God, not to choose his own values but
to say yes or no to the values chosen for him.
This tension between the yes and the no produces the
dualism of good and evil which is at the heart of Christi
anity.

With this neatly divided dualism, man's course is

clearly defined for him, so Spenser can send his Redcrosse
Knight forth:
Upon a great adventure he was bond,
That greatest Gloriana to him g�ve,
That greatest Glorious Queene of Faerie lond,
To win him worship, and her grave to have,
Which of all earthly things he most did crave;
And ever as he rode his heart did earne
To prove his puissance in battell brave
Upon his foe and his new force to learn;
Upon his foe, a Dragon horrible and stearne.29
The dualism is now set:

Gloriana represents the good, godly

way, and the Dragon represents the evil, satanic way.

Based
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on this dualism of good and evil, an intricate hierarchy of
ethical values arises from the interplay of the opposing
forces:

God and Satan, heaven and hell, heaven and earth,

law and lawlessness, spirit and flesh, soul and body, reason
and instinct, reason and passion, sobriety and excess.
The dualistic tension between heaven and hell acts as
a prod for the Christian value system because the hope of re
ward in heaven and the fear of punishment in hell motivate
the actions of the adherents of Spenser's Christianity.

The

fifth Bead-man in Spenser's House of Holinesse attends to
those on the verge of death, facing either heaven or hell:
For them most needeth comfort in the end,
When sin, and hell, and death do most dismay
The feeble soule departing hence away,
All is but los, that living we bestow,
If not well ended at our dying day.
0 man have mind of that last bitter throw, .
The implication of this statement is clear:
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man is to live

in the present so that on his dying day he will receive eter
nal reward rather than eternal punishment.

If the present is

sacrificed for the future, then the future must be of more
value than the present.

Spenser's "saint,'' then, concentrates

his energy and value on getting out of this life for the same
reason Icarus cone ntrates his energy and value on getting
out of the labyrinth:

they both value something beyond their

particular labyrinth more than the labyrinth itself.

Again,

the value of an action in this system has extrinsic value
because its value is determined not by the action in itself
but by a future, external evaluation by God at the moment of

25
death.

Since this decision of God's is eternally binding, it

would be wise for man to sacrifice immediate, temporal con
cerns for future, eternal concerns.

The Christian hierarchy

of value stems from this tension between the here and the
hereafter; therefore, the goal in Spenser's value system is
to become what you will be, which, as we will soon see, is
the opposite of Nietzsche's goal to "become what you are!

1131

If heaven is the ultimate goal in Spenser's Christianity, then what type of ethics and values will his characters strive for and exhibit in their earthly life so they can
achieve this goal?

The most important virtue would certainly

be obedience to the laws of God, and the Redcrosse Knight
realizes the importance of this when, in the House of Holinesse,
Fidelia "taught celestiall discipline, / And opened his dull
eyes, that light mote in them shine.11 3 2 If a man sticks to
the "Narrow path" and avoids "the wandering wood, this
Errours den,"33he will enter heaven in glory.
Again, the spiritual realm is of more value than the
physical realm in Spenser's system, so another Christian
value would be to emphasize man's spirit over his fleshly
body.

Not only does Christianity give priority to the spirit,

but it places the blame for most deviations from the "narrow
path" directly on the sinful nature of the body.

When Red

crosse goes to the House of Holinesse to be healed, "sad
Repentance'' bathes "His bodie in salt water smarting sore, /
The filthy blots of sinne to wash away.11 34

To enter heaven,

Man must bridle the sinful desires of his body, controlling
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his immediate, earthly passions by the grace of God and the
use of his reason.
The powers or reason were of great importance to the
renaissance culture in which Spenser lived, and he asserts
throughout The Faerie Queene that reason is the means to override the desires of the sinful body:
. but reason can repaire.

11
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"Flesh may empaire,

Man's reason, according to

Spenser, will lead him away from excess and towards modera
tion in all things earthly, an idea directly related to
Aristotle's golden mean.

Spenser uses the whole of Book II

of his work and the allegorical agent of Sir Guyon to illus
trate this value, which he calls temperance.

Guyon's com

panion is the Palmer, who represents the controlling power
of reason:
Then Guyon forward gan his voyage make,
With his blacke Palmer, that him guided still.
Still he him guided over dale and hill,
And with his steedie staff did point his way:
His race with reason, and with words his will,
From foule intemperance he oft did stay,
And suffred not in wrath his hastie steps to stray.36
So the basic character of an adherent of Spenser's Christian
value system would be sober, grave, obedient, heavenly minded
and temperant; he would always disregard the instincts and
passion of his fleshly body to gain his spiritual goal of
eternal reward in the after life.
This Christian value system of Spenser's The Faerie
Queene was the dominant theological and sociological system
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throughout the renaissance and reformation, and it is still
one of the most influential ethical value systems today.

But

an antithetical value system began to arise, fostered by the
new discoveries of science.

Friedrich Nietzsche was one of

the first men to recognize this shift in values, and his
philosophical allegory Thus Spoke Zarathustra is his most
complete and influential formulation of the new "Existential"
value system.
Allegory in "Thus Spoke Zarathustra
Is Thus Spoke Zarathustra an allegory?

Since Friedrich

Nietzsche is known primarily as a philosopher and since Zara
thustra is clearly a narrative work, it easily falls within
Frye's statement that "We have allegory when the events of a
narrative obviously and continuously refer to another simultaneous structure of events or ideas,

II

Nietzsche's

primary intention was a revaluation of all values in light
of the death of God, and he used the narrative line in Zara
thustra to convey this central concern.
The principal character in Nietzsche's allegory is, of
course, Zarathustra, and he is an excellent example of a
daemonic agent because he represents and is obse$sed with a
single idea:

"I have the overman at heart, that is my first

and only concern .

.. 3 7

Nietzsche's choice of Zarathustra

as his central symbol was intentionally ironic:

the original

Zarathustra, or Zoraster, was a Persian prophet in the sixth

•
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century B.C. who was one of the first truly dualistic thinkers,
influencing both Greek and Christian thought.

The irony of

Nietzsche's choice lies in the fact that his Zarathustra
sought to overthrow this dualistic thinking and replace it
with a monism revolving around the "will to power" and its
expression by the overman.

Nietzsche also ironically sets

up his Zarathustra as a type of Christ with his many biblical
allusions, especially in "The Last Supper" section in part
four.

The characters that surround Zarathustra at this sup

per represent single aspects of Nietzsche's vision of the
nature of the overman, making t�em daemonic also:

the leech

is the "conscientious in spirit," the ugliest man is the
murderer of God, etc.
Nietzsche's agents and images also fit the description
of cosmic imagery because they function on both the narrative
and ideal level that is essential for allegory.

The main

characteristic of the cosmic image--its "isolated nature"-
is seen throughout Thus Spoke Zarathustra, with Nietzsche
providing his protagonist with two central talismans:
An eagle soared through the sky in wide circles,
and on him there hung a serpent, not like prey
but like a friend: for she kept herself wound
around his neck.
"These are my animals," said Zarathustra
and was happy in his heart. "The proudest animal
under the sun and the wisest animal under the
11 38
sun-- •
The eagle is a positive talisman, signifying Zarathustra's
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desire to soar above the values of his culture, but by
choosing the serpent as an insignia and talisman for his hero,
Nietzsche shows his opposition to the Judeo/Christian system
where the serpent is associated with Satan and evil.
sche also reverses the use of astral symbolism:

Nietz

Spenser

wanted man to look to the stars and heavens for his "heavenly
cause" and value, but Zarathustra loves "those who do not first
seek behind the stars for a reason to go under and be a sacrifice,
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Instead, he uses the sun, which gives the

earth its life and energy, as his central astral symbol: "You
great star, what would your happiness be had you not those
for whom you shine? 11
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Yes,_ Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra clearly fits
the definition of allegory in Chapter One, but what type of
values does Nietzsche advocate through Zarathustra, and why
are they opposed to Spenser's Christian value system?
Nietzsche and the Existential Value System
As Nietzsche wrote Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the ideas of
Darwin were just taking hold, and the Christian value system
was at low tide.

Nietzsche, writing some twenty years after

the publication of The Origin of the Species, wa� one of the
first men, if not the first, to sense the full impact of
Darwin's theory on the theological, psychological, and socio
logical values of his culture.

Since Thus Spoke Zarathustra

is a herald of the decay of an "age's highest aspirations,"
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Nietzsche's intent is to diagnose that decay and provide a
remedy:

he must redefine and revaluate his "age's highest

aspirations�"
In 1883 Nietzsche wrote what serves as a preface to
Zarathustra; entitled "The Madman," this parable contains
the central axiom of Nietzsche's value system:
. "Whither is God" he cried. "I shall tell
you. We have killed him -you and I. All of us
are his murderers. But how have we done this?
How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave
us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon?
What did we do when we unchained this earth from
its sun? .
. Do we not hear anything yet of the
noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do
we not smell anything yet of God's decomposition?
Gods too decompose. God is dead. God remains
dead. 41
11

God is dead:

with this proclamation, Nietzsche eliminates

the foundational premise of all Judeo/Christian thought,
chopping off the vital root of a value system such as Spen
ser's. Just as Spenser takes God's existence as axiomatic,
so Nietzsche takes God's death as axiomatic.

Neither writer

attempts to prove his position because neither writer is concerned with metaphysics:

they are bo,th concerned with how

to live their lives in light of these axioms.
Another important axiom in Nietzsche's system is the
idea that man originally created God to give his values an
eternal, absolute reference point.

Zarathustra tells of his

own belief in God, but he soon realized that "this god whom
I created was man-made and madness, like all gods!

Man he
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was,

• out of my own ashes and fire this ghost came to

me and, verily, it did not come to me from beyond.11 42

Once

created, man used this focal point to define the particulars
of his world, rendering value for them according to the dic
tates of his God.

But as man came to understand the partic-·

ulars, he began to reason back to the general premises, and
science was born.

Soon, just as Zeus destroyed Cronos, science

began to destroy its progenator and reference point:

God.

The first major step in this parracide was, in the words of
the Madman, to unchain this earth from its sun, a step taken
by Copernicus and Galileo.

The second major step was taken

by Darwin with his theory of evolution:

by placing the burden

of creation directly on the organism (the earth) itself, the
idea of a creator was no longer necessary.
Since man created both the reference point (God) and
the destroyer of it (science), man is then the cause of the
destruction of his own value system, or as the Madman would
put it:

"We have killed him--you and I."

If God is now

dead, man must face his world--his labyrinth--without the help
of the providential, guiding hand of God.

Without this teleo

logical reference point, man can no longer hope for his values
to be given approval from a source outside of himself.

With

out God, there is not an external assigner of value, so value
must come from man himself.

Now man's judgment becomes the

assigner of value, and we are led back to Zarathustra's state
ment that "through esteeming alone is there value."
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Now that man and his judgment are the center of his value
system instead of an omnipotent God, and since man is now
responsible for determining his own value, his psychological
attitude and opinion of himself is crucial in this search for
new values.

Zarathustra clearly states his opinion of man,

which is the essential starting point for his value system:
Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman--a
rope over an abyss. A dangerous across, a dangerous
on-the-way, a dangerous looking-back, a dangerous
shuddering and stopping. What is great in man is
that he is a bridge and not an end: what can be
loved !n man is that he is an overture and a going
under. 3
"I love man" proclaims Zarathustra, and the basis for this
love is the potential of man to move beyond himself towards
a higher state of being--the overman.

Now, instead of man's

meaning being determined by God and the hope of reward and
the threat of punishment in the after-life, his meaning resides in himself and his desire to overcome himself:

"I will

teach men the meaning of their existence--the overman.

11
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Nietzsche's conception of the overman is probably one
of the most misunderstood philosophical ideas in western
thought, due mostly to two reasons.

First, many English speak

ing scholars and writers translate the German word that Nietz
sche uses, "Ubermensche," as "superman," complete with all the
connotations of a power-mad super-being willing to trample on
his fellow man in quest of domination.

Much of this connota

tive meaning stems from the second reason this term is mis-
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understood.

Nietzsche's idea of the overman was unfortunately

and erroneously associated with Hitler and the Nazi movement
because his sister, who obtained the rights to his work after
he went insane, used excerpts of his writing out of context
to support a proto-Nazi group led by her husband.

The fact

that Nietzsche detested any type of nationalism in general
and his sister's ideas in particular has been thoroughly and
painstakingly treated by Walter Kaufmann in his definitive,
45
critical biography of Nietzsche's. life and work.
What then does Nietzsche mean by overman?

The most

complete picture of the nature of the overman is in Zara
thustra's speech "On Those Who Are Sublime":
He should act like a bull, and his happiness should
smell of the earth, and not contempt for the earth
• . . Though I love the bull's neck on him, I also
want to see the eyes of the angel • . . To stand
with relaxed muscles and unharnessed will: that
is most difficult for all of you who are sublime.
When power becomes gracious and descends into the
visible--such descent I call beauty. And there is
nobody from whom I want beauty as much as from you
who are powerful: let your kindness be your final
self-conquest. Of all evil I deem you capable:
therefore I want the good from you. 46
Nietzsche's overman is a combination of a bull and an angel,
power and kindness, power and beauty.

In him, all the dual

istic opposites of a system such as Spenser's are united.
Nietzsche's overman seeks to overcome himself by fusing to
gether good and evil (thesis and antithesis), creating a
higher nature for himself and a higher truth (synthesis):
"Everything that the good call evil must come together so
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that one truth may be born.
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Before discussing what the

nature of this monism is, it is essential to explore what
impowers the overman to achieve this goal.
In a Christian value system like Spenser's, man received
the impetus to achieve his meaning and goal from outside the
labyrinth--the will of God--but now that man is the source of
his own values, he must look within himself for this impetus,
finding it in the "ego . .

this creating, willing, valuing

ego, which is the measure and value of things.

11 4 8

Zarathus

trd teaches that man's ego and its catalyst, the will are the
1
source of man's value and his meaning.

Man's will �etermines

what is valuable because it has the power to esteem certain
events and entities as better than others, and "to esteem is
to create.

11 49

Since man created God via his will for an eternal refer
ence point for his values and now that he has killed this
God via his own will, he must revaluate his entire value system
based on his creative ego.

He must learn to affirm with his

whole being a new pride in his creative ability:
A new pride my ego taught me, and this I teach
men: no longer to bury one's head in the sand of
heavenly things, but to bear it freely, an earthly
head, which creates a meaning for the earth. SO
With this new sense of pride in his creative ego, man has the
impetus to create and achieve his goal--a new meaning for the
earth.
In this creating, willing ego Nietzsche found the essen-
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tial force of the universe which became the ultimate ground
of his monism:

the will to power.

He discovered this by

observing the value judgments of man and concluded that man,
through these judgments, created good and evil by his creative
will:

Zarathustra found no greater power on earth than
good and evil.
. A tablet of the good hangs
over every people. Behold, it is the tablet of
their overcomin s; behold, it is the voice of their
will to power.5

1

Many critics treat Nietzsche's idea of the will to power in
the same way as the overman:

they interpret this drive for

power as a desire to dominate others.

But the key to a cor

rect understanding of this concept is again in the term "over
come.''

The �ill to power is the means for man to overcome

himself not his fellow man:
liberator and joy bringer.11 52

"Will--that is the name of the
Nietzsche contends that man,

through his will to power, created good and evil, heaven and
hell, and all the other opposing forces of a dualistic world
view like Spenser's. Since the interplay between these oppo
sites was the source of meaning for man and the earth, it is
the task of the overman to create a new meaning for the earth
now that the old dualism has been resolved into a monism of
the will to power.
Without the dualistic tension between heaven and hell,
God and the devil, man must find his value and goal in some
thing other than the after-life.

Zarathustra might just as

well have been speaking to Spenser when he said, "By my
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honor, friend,
exist:

• all that of which you speak does not

there is no devil and hell.

before your body:

Your soul will be dead

fear nothing further."
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This passage

signals one of the most important differences between Spenser's value system and Nietzsche's:

instead of man seeking

his value and meaning in heaven and the after-life� he must
now turn to the earth and his present, temporal life for his
value and meaning; he must seek his value in the labyrinth
itself:
. remain faithful to the earth, and do not
believe those who speak to you of otherworldly
hopes!
• • Once the sin against God was the
greatest sin, but God died,
• To sin against
the earth is now the most dreadful thing, and to
esteem the entrails of the unknowable higher than
the meaning of the earth. 5 4
Spenser's value system is based on what man will be and what
reality will be in the future; Nietzsche's value system is
based on what man is and what reality is now, in the present:
Nietzsche's is an ''existentialist" value system because it re
volves around what man is and how he exists in the present.
Zarathustra's supreme ethical demand reflects the difference
clearly:

"Become what you are!�

If this statement represents the ultimate goal in
Nietzsche's system, then what type of values and ethics will
his overman strive for and exhibit in order to achieve this
goal?

Spenser's ethics are based on obedience to the dic

tates of God, but Nietzsche's ethics are based around the
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will to power and its ability to create new values by fusing

together the dualistic opposites:

"And whoever must be a

creator in good and evil, verily, he must first be an annihil
ator and break values.
highest goodness:

Thus the highest evil belongs to the
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but th.is .is creat.ive. ,.

The overman must

experience both extremes of good and evil, so Spenser's value
of temperance and the golden mean would have no place at all
in Zarathustra's system.

In The Faerie Queene excess is

associated with evil (especially in "The Bowre of Bliss")
while sobriety and gravity are associated with good, but in
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the opposite is true:
I would believe only in a god who could dance.
And when I saw my devil I found him serious, thor·ough, profound, and solemn: it was the spirit of
gravity--through him all things fall. Not by wrath
does one kill but by laughter. Come, let us kill
the spirit of gravityr 5 6
Nietzsche uses the symbol of the dionysian dance throughout
Zarathustra to characterize the overman as one caught in the
rapture of excessive joy and laughter --which is one of the
main qualities of the overman's nature.
Since excess is a supreme value in Zarathustra's ethics
and values, then passion must be valued more than reason
and the body valued more than the spirit or soul�
But the awakened and knowing say: body I am en
tirely, and nothing else; and soul is only a word
for something about the body. • • • An instrument
of your body is also your little reason, my brother,
which you call "spirit"--a little instrument and
toy of your great reason. 57
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Since there is not a heaven or a hell and only this earth,
Zarathustra's values center on the physical, sensual reality
rather than the spiritual, ideal reality of a value system
such as Spenser's
To "remain faithful to the earth " is the goal of the
overman.

Instead of turning to heaven for value, he will turn

to the earth and embrace and affirm it in all its contrasting
and contradicting glory, uniting these opposites by his
creative will to power:

"And this is all my creating and

striving, that I create and carry together into One what is
fragment and riddle and dreadful accident.

11 58

The overman

will ultimately fuse the apparent dualistic opposites into
the ''One" monistic whole which is the essential nature of
reality according to the value system of Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
Nietzsche's Overman:
Kafka, Camus, and Kazantzakis
In Zarathustra's initial speech--"On the Three Metamor
phoses"--Nietzsche provides the reader with the three stages
he invisions man passing through on his way to becoming overman:

"Of three metamorphoses of the spirit I tell you:

how

the spirit becomes a camel; and the camel, a lion; and the
1.ion, f'1na 11y, a ch'ld
1 . ..
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The next two chapters of this

thesis seek to illustrate how Franz Kafka's The Castle,
Albert Camus' The Plague, and Nikos Kazantzakis

Zorba The
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Greek, each represent allegorically a character or characters passing through one of the three stages along the path
towards the overman:

The Castle represents the "camel" stage;

The Plague represents the "lion" stage; and Zorba The Greek
represents the final stage in becoming an overman--the "child."
Chapter Three analyzes the three novels in light of the cri
teria for allegory given in Chapter One, while the fourth,
and final, chapter explores the connection between the three
allegories and Nietzsche's three stages of the overman.

40

CHAPTER III
ALLEGORY IN
KAFKA, CAMUS, AND KAZANTZAKIS

-- The �eakeh 6ok puke powek, which i�
at the heakt 06 all allegokieal gue�t�,
goe� on in �pite 06 it� 6undamental
4..kkati..onali..ttj.
Angus Fletcher
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Allegorical Intention in
Kafka, Camus, and Kazantzakis
The majority of Franz Kafka's works easily fit the cri
terion of double intention, moving between the narrative and
ideal levels, set up in Chapter One.

Fletcher refers to

Kafka in conjunction with allegory over twenty times in his
study of the genre, considering Kafka one of the best ex
amples of a modern allegorist.

But the strongest evidence

of allegorical intention in Kafka's The Castle comes from
Edwin Muir--one of the first to translate Kafka's work into
English and one of the leading Kafka authorities--who pro
vides this.synopsis of Kafka's technique in the novel:
As pure imaginative creations K.'s scenes have
this packed ±ullness which gives them simultane
ously several meanings, one concealed beneath the
other, until in a trivial or commonplace situation
we find an image of some universal or mythical
event such as the Fall of Man. It is in this way
that Kafka's allegory works. He has been blamed
for confusing two worlds; for introducing real
people, living in real houses,
. and then by
a sudden twist making all their actions symbolical
and bringing them into actual contact with emblem
atical figures. The answer is that this was ob
viously the thing he was trying to do.60
Along with pointing out the double intention in Kafka's
The Castle, Muir singles out one of the major differences
between an allegorist like Spenser and one like Kafka:

the

former places his agents in a mythical, romantic setting
(Faerie Land), while the latter places his agents in a more
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real-life situation, creating the "mixture of realism and

" 61

allegory which is Kafka's peculiar invention.

As one of the masterpieces of the twentieth century,
Albert Camus' The Plague has been treated by critics in many
different ways, but most recognize it as an allegory.

Flet

cher refers to Camus' novel as an allegory many times, and
Philip Thody, one of the leading experts on Camus' work, calls
62
The Plague an "allegory of the hostile nature of the absurd. 11

Donald Lazere--in The Unique Creation of Albert Camus--en
titles his chapter on The Plague "Naturalistic Allegory,"
explaining that
In The Plague Camus audaciously synthesized the
ultimate extension of both of the opposing techn.iques into an allegorical naturalism. .
Trt-1
is an incisive .
portrayal that reveals universal truths about any group of humans in crisis. 63
The final clause of this quote shows Camus moving between the
ideal level ("universal truths") and the narrative level
\"group of humans"), a point Adele King reinforces:
form and style of the novel exist on two levels:

"The

the level at

which Rieux writes his 'cronicle' as objectively as possible
and the level at which Camus creates a myth about man's
fate. ,,64
Like Kafka, Camus' allegory is much more realistic than
either Spenser's or Nietzsche's, so we should look for agents
to appear in real-life, rather than imaginary, settings and
situations.

Camus would not have gone to the trouble of
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documenting the plague so thoroughly if he did not intend
for it to be taken realistically, yet it still functions on
the ideal level at the same time.
If we are to treat Zorba The Greek as an allegory, we
must keep in mind Fletcher's statement that "no 'pure alle
gory' will ever be found.

There is therefore no harm in

drawing instances from borderline cases."

Kazantzakis' no

vel is on the borderline primarily because his character
Zorba is based on his real-life friend, George Zorba, so it
will be a much more realistic example of allegory than most
allegorical works.
But Zorba The Greek is truly a narrative which "obvi
ously and continuously refeII s 1 to another simultaneous
.,.

structure of events or ideas," as Frye would say.

Morton

Levitt--in his pioneering book on Kazantzakis, The Cretan
Glance--asserts that Zorba The Greek is Kazantzakis' "most
metaphysical work, 11

6

5

and that if we want to "find the truth

of the novel, we must look not to history but to its philo
sophical roots.

11

66

Still, the best evidence of Kazantzakis'

intention to fuse together his philosophy and art is in the
novel itself:

"If only I could never open my mouth, I thought,

until the abstract idea had reached its highest point- and
had become a story!"
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These are the words of the narrator,

who many critics feel represents aspects of Kazantzakis him
self.

We also learn through the narrator who Kazantzakis

intends to embody his ideal:

"my thoughts flitted around the

most remote ideas but came back and settled on Zorba.

11

68
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These two passages from Zorba The Greek show that Kazantza
kis intended his novel to function on both the narrative and
ideal level, which is the main characteristic of allegorical
literature.
The Daemonic Agent in
Kafka, Camus, and Kazantzakis
In a traditional Christian allegory like The Faerie
Queene, the daemonic nature of the agents stands out clearly
because they are placed in fantastic, unrealistic settings;
therefore, the more realistic the allegory, the less obvious
the daemonic agents will be.

Since it was Kafka's "peculiar

invention" to mix realism and allegory, his agents will be
Fletcher's first point

subtly and realistically daemonic.

about daemonic agents is that they "compartmentalize func
tion," which means the procedure and goal of the agent is
divided into a hierarchy of separate segments.

The intri

cate, bureaucratic hierarchy K.--the central agent in The
Castle--contends with is an excellent example of comparmental
izing function.
Kafka's Land-Surveyor, K., fits Fletcher's second
characteristic of a daemonic agent because he is clearly
obsessed and motivated by a single concern:

"It's my most

urgent wish, really my only wish, to get my business with
the authorities properly settled."
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This single-mindedness,

according to Fletcher, causes the agent to limit his freedom,
and action to a single goal:
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The daemonic agent has no choice but to go and
then stay bound on his quest, whether for learn
ing and self-knowledge, or for holiness, or for
simple power, or for some object he himself cannot
define, which may be the case with Kafka's favor
ite hero, K.70
Even though K. is not compelled by an outside force to stay
in the village and fight the authorities, when Frieda (K.'s
fiancee) begs him to leave the village he replies:
go away, I came here to stay.

I'll stay here." 7

"I can't

1

When a character's life is controlled by "rigid habits,"
they are, according to Fletcher, daemonic, and Kafka's K. is
just such a character.

If he is to realize his goal of set

tling his business with the authorities of the Castle, he
must work within the strict rules and regulations of the
bureaucracy he faces.

Burgel, one of the few Castle officials

K, actually speaks with, explains why the process of communieating with the Castle is so "ruthless":

"Actually this

ruthlessness, when you come to think of it, is nothing but
a rigid obedience to and execution of their duty,

II
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Indeed, a great deal of K.'s problem in getting through to the
authorities stems from his unwillingness , at first, to adhere
to this rigid system of "habits."
In many ways, Camus' The Plague is a more realistic work
than Kafka's The Castle, so the daemonic nature of Camus'
agents will be even more subtle than Kafka's agents.

The

plague itself is the central agent in the novel, and it obvi
ously "compartmentalizes function" because it imposes a rigid
hierarchy of procedures on the people of Oran which they
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must follow if they are to avoid and defeat it.
Before the plague descends on Oran, Camus portrays the
citizens of the town as daemonic--for they are obsessed with
a single idea:
Our citizens work hard, but solely with the ob
ject of getting rich. Their chief interest is in
comm(irce, and their chief aim in life is, as they
call it, "doing business. 11 7 3
When the plague does descend on Oran, the people become obsessed with another, more important, single concern:

"Since

plague became in this way some men's duty, it revealed itself as what it really was; that is, the concern of all."
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Each of the main agents in the novel has a central concern
that they must learn to adapt to situations they are put in
by the plague:

Rieux wants only to cure; Tarrou wants only

peace of mind; Rambert wants only to see his lover again;
and Grand wants only to hear "Hats off!" in praise of his
novel.
The people of Oran, both before and during the plague,
base their lives around their own "rigid habits."

Prior to

the plague, Rieux says of his fellow citizens,
IThel truth is that everyone is bored, and devotes
6ims�lf to cultivating habits,
. It will be
said, no doubt, that these habits are not peculiar
to our town; really all our contemporaries are
much the same. 75
During the plague, these people must change their habits from
swimming, making love, and making money to the rigid habits
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imposed on them by the plague:

they must now center their

lives around the ritual regulations and quarantines if they
hope to survive the epidemic.

Rieux is forced to make habits

out of the constant diagnoses, innoculations, and lancing
of buboes if he is to help save his fellow citizens; these
"habits" make him a realistically daemonic agent.
As with Kafka and Camus, the .more naturalistic the alle
gory, the less apparent the

daemonic aspects of the agent

will be, but these aspects are still present in a very com
plex way in Kazantzakis' central agent, Zorba.

That Kazant

zakis intended Zorba to represent a single idea--the child
stage of Nietzsche's overman--will be more than evident when
the connection between Nietzsche and Kazantzakis is made
clear, so it will suffice now to say that Zorba is obsessed
with a single idea, and, therefore, he is a daemonic agent.
This daemonic aspect is more obvious in Kazantzakis' narrator-agent, the Boss:
one desire:

II

. I have always been consumed with

to touch and see as much as possible of the

earth and sea before I die .

11
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Again, because of the nature of the ideal, Kazantzakis
wanted to portray in Zorba, we will not see his main char
acter being controlled by "rigid habits."

Nietzsche's child

--like Zorba--is one who is free from and unconstrained by
"rigid habits."

But we do see this aspect of the daemonic

agent in the character who acts as a foil to Zorba, the
Boss:

he is controlled by his habits of "chewing up" books

and pencil-pushing.
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When characters fit this three-fold description of the
daemonic agent, they appear--according to Fletcher--to be
static, two dimensional figures, causing "agency 1:to be=I
confused with imagery."

The two assistants assigned to K.

by the Castle are an excellent example of this fusion

of

agent and image;after K. throws the assistants out of the
school he and Frieda are employed as janitors in, they run
to the railings of the school's garden, climbing around like
monkeys on bars:
There they ran to and fro holding onto the rail
ings, then remained standing and stretched out
their clasped hands beseechingly toward K. They
went on like this for a long time, without think
ing of the uselessness of their efforts; they
were as if obsessed, . • . So as not to have to
hold on all the time, one of them had hooked him
s�lf onto the railings behind by the tail of his
coat.77
In The Plague, one of Rieux's patients--an old man with
asthma--becomes a static image because his only activity in
life is to transfer peas from one pan into another.

Kazant

zakis provides our final instance of the allegorical fusion
of agent and image with his description of Zorba's "fiancee,"
Madame Hortense, who looks like
a noble three masted frigate and all her lovers
she had seen forty-five working years··-were
boarding her, climbing into the holds, onto the
gunwale, into the rigging, while she sailed
along, . . . 78
This type of static, constant action by allegorical agents
makes them appear as "cosmic images," or, as Albert Camus
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so aptly described Kafka's agents, as "inspired automata."
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The Cosmic Image in
Kafka, Camus, and Kazantzakis
In traditional Christian allegory, the cosmic image-
especially the talisman or insignio--is a source of power
for the agent, but Fletcher contends that "with Kafka kosmos
becomes imbued with doubt and anxiety; hierarchy itself
·
causes fear, hatred, tentative approach, tentative retreat." 80
Consequently, the talismans and insignias Kafka surrounds K.
with in The Castle should deprive him of power rather than
provide him with it.

The letters K. receives from Klamm,

the authority in charge of his case, illustrate this use of
the talisman.

The first letter gives K. "proof'' of his iden

tity as a Land-Surveyor; he is so impowered by this letter
that he nails it on the wall of his room, replacing a religious picture that previously hung there.
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But this elation

and security does not last for long, because the mayor and
others point out that it is not an "official" letter, and it
could even be a forger1, thus rendering it powerless in K. 's
quest for recognition from the Castle.
A traditional Christian allegory like The Faerie Queene
will also employ cosmic, astral imagery to show the power
the heavens can offer the agent, but, again, Kafka reverses
this practice to illustrate the powerlessness of K. in his
attempt to penetrate into the Castle.

When K. realizes that

his messenger Barnabas--K. 's only means of communication with
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the Castle--will be unable to help him in his q u est, he m u ses
to himself that Barnabas "was of j u st as little help as the
stars up there against the tempest down below."
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Fletcher asserts that one of the main characteristics
of the cosmic images is its "isolation." and Camus' The Plagu e
employs this "isolation" imagery to convey one of the main
themes of the novel--portraying the effects of plag u e-like
evil when it cu ts off a group of people from the rest of
humanity.

Rieu x describes Oran a� "hu mped snailwise on

its plateau and shut off almost everywhere from the sea,"
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and as "a lost island of the damned,11 84 which are both isolated, cosmic images.
Camus

u ses

talismans and insignias in portraying the

plag u e itself since it is such an abstract, unseen agent in
the novel.

The first sign of the plagu e is the rats that

infest the town and then die of the plagu e.

Its first victim,

M. Michel, int uitively knows of the connection between the
rats and his disease, constantly babbling "Them rats!
damn rats!"

as death approaches. 85

Them

Father Panelou x provides

the plague with another talisman in his first sermon du ring
the epidemic:
He bade his hearers pict u re a huge wooden bar
whirling above the town, striking at random,
swinging up again in a shower of drops of blood,
and spreading carnage and suffering on earth, • .
He uses this winnowing blade or bar in his analogy of the
Christian explanation of why the town has been struck with

86
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the plague:

God is using it to separate the wheat from the

chaff, and those that die deserve it because they have sinned
against God.

Like Kafka's talismans, these cosmic images do

not provide the agents with power, instead, they deprive them
of both power and life.
Camus reverses astral imagery for the same reason, to
show that man cannot rely on the heavens for help or power:
Thus each of us had to be content to live only for
the day, alone under the vast indifference of the
sky. This sense of being abandoned, which might
in time have given characters a finer temper,
began, however, by sapping them to the point of
futility. . • . they seemed at the mercy of the
sky's caprices--in other words, suffered and hoped
irrationally. 87
In Zor�a The Greek, Kazantzakis provides both of his
main characters, the Boss and Zorba, with talismans or insig
nias.

In keeping with the bookish nature of the Boss, Kazant

zakis has him carry "a little edition of Dante--my travelling
88

companion 11

and write a book on the Buddha.

Both of these

talismans work in the same way as Kafka's and Camus' talismans
since they represent the ideas keeping him from becoming
like Zorba and the idea he represents.

Zorba's talisman, on

the other hand, impowers him with the strength to be his ideal,
functioning as Spenser's talismans do.

Zorba's talisman is

the santuri, a dulcimer-like instrument, that he bought at
the age of twenty with the money he intended to use for his
upcoming wedding:
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Since I learned to play the santuri, I've been
a different man. When I'm feeling down, or when
I'm broke, I play the santuri and it cheers me up.
When I'm playing, you can talk to me, I hear no
thing and even if I hear, I can't speak, • • • A
passion, that's what it is! 89
Kazantzakis often uses astral imagery as metaphors that
show the state of mind of his characters.

The longer the Boss

is with Zorba, the more he is affected by his outlook on life,
and Kazantzakis employs astral imagery to illustrate this .
change:
I I-the Boss 1, for my part, stayed awake a long
time, watching the stars travel across the sky.
I saw the whole sky change its position--and the
shell of my skull, like an observatory dome,
changed position, too, together with the constel
lations.
"Watch the movement of the stars as if
you were turning with them. • • . " This sentence
of Marcus Aurelius filled my heart with harmony.�O
Zorba's child-like nature, one of the most important aspects
of the Nietzschean overman, is conveyed by Kazantzakis with
the help of astral imagery:

"Zorba looked at the sky with

open mouth in a sort of ecstasy as though he were seeing it
91
for the first time.11
All three of these modern works--The Castle, The Plague,
and Zorba The Greek--function simultaneously on the narrative
and the ideal level, showing the double intention so impor
tant to this genre.

Kafka and Camus extensively use both

the daemonic agent and the cosmic image, while Kazantzakis
employs enough aspects of the allegorical agent and image
to be considered a borderline case of allegory until the best
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evidence for allegory in Zorba The Greek is presented--the
connection between Kazantzakis and Nietzsche.
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CHAPTER IV
NIETZSCHEAN VALUES IN
KAFKA, CAMUS, AND KAZANTZAKIS

-- I love tho-0e who do not 6�k-0t -0eek beh�nd
the -0tak-0 6ok a kea-0on to go undek and be a
-0aek�6iee, but who -0aek�6�ee them-0elve-0 60�
the eakth, and the eakth may -0ome day become
the ovekman'-0. - Nietzsche's Zarathustra
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Kafka and the Camel

-- What �/2 d�66�cult? a/2k/2 the /2p���t
that would beak much, and kneel/2 down
l�ke a camel want�ng to be well loaded.
What �/2 mo/2t d�66�cult, 0 hekoe/2, a/2k/2
the /2p�k�t that would beak much, that I
may take �t upon my/2el6 and exult �n my
/2Uength? -Nietzsche's Zarathustra
What type of value system is Kafka trying to portray
in The Castle?

Most critics--including Thomas Mann, Angus

Fletcher, Albert Camus, and Walter Kaufmann--view Kafka as
primarily a religious, theological writer, concerned pri
marily with -the effect of religion on the values and actions
of man.

Camus calls The Castle a "theology in action,"
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and Muir points out how important religion is to Kafka and
his work:
We must give a contingent assent to Kafka's re
ligion, therefore, before we can understand the
world of his imagination. . . . At its center
and in its most remote minifestations, lies the
dogma of the incommensurability of divine and
human law which Kafka adopted from Kierkegaard. 9 3
The idea that Kafka adopted from Kierkegaard comes from the
latter's book Fear and Trembling in which he uses the story
of the sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham to illustrate the dif
ference between divine and human law.

Kierkegaard was con

stantly concerned with the apparently unbridgeable gulf be
tween the orders and laws of the deity and the abilities of
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man to carry out these orders and laws, which seem to con
flict with his own moral values.
If this central religious idea is allegorically applied
to The Castle, then the Castle represents the divine realm,
the village represents the human realm, and the task of
Kafka's protagonist is to accept the policies of the divine
and incorporate them into his human situation.

As the head

of the Castle, Count Westwest would then represent God, and
the workers and officials of the Castle would then represent
the priests of God's church, acting as mediators between the
divine and the human.
There has been a good deal of critical debate about the
existence of God in the theological framework of The Castle.
Critics such as Mann and Muir assume that God exists
that man is unable to communicate with him.

but

The late Walter

Kaufmann, probably the leading authority on Existentialism,
offers a different interpretation of The Castle's allegory:
In the usual exegesis, Kafka's Castle stands for
God: the hero is remote from God, while the people
of the village are nearer to God, and the problem
is one of divine grace. At the beginning of the
novel, however, we are told that the Castle is the
castle of Count Westwest, and after that the count
no longer figures in the story. The German "west"
means "decomposes." I suggest that in The Castle�
God is dead, and we are faced with a world devoid
of sense. The villagers are not close to God:
in the words of Nietzsche's "madman" in The Gay
Science "this tremendous event .
• has not yet
reached the ears of men. 11 94
Although Kafka never gives much substantial "proof" for
either the existence or death of God, Kaufmann' s interpreta-
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tion seems the most probable because no one has ever seen
the Count.

When K. asks the teacher if he knows the Count,

he replies, "No,

. Why should I?

. Please remember

that there are innocent children present.11 95

Kaufmann's point

about the German word "west" would also seem to indicate that
God is dead, but the most important question is what effect
does it have on man and his human situation.

Man's existen

tial situation is the same whether God exists or not:

either

way he is unable to communicate with the deity, and he must
face his life without it.
I contend that Kafka, like most people, does not know
for sure if God exists or not--but what he does know is that
he must live in a culture where all values flow from the pre
mise of God's existence.

In The Castle K. is not very con

cerned with whether there is really a Count Westwest or not,
but he is obsessively concerned with getting approval from
the Castle of his position in the village--in the labyrinth.
K. has supposedly been contracted by the Castle to function
in the village as a Land-Surveyor; but when he arrives he is
unexpected and unwanted:

in fact, he is asked on his first

.evening in the village to "quit the Count's territory at
once.11 9 6

Without divine sanction from

the Castle, K. is

an alien and a stranger in the village, and he must obtain
this sanction before he will be accepted in the village.
This obsessive concern with man in his temporal, human situa"
tion is the existential element so important to Kafka's work.
If K. is to be accepted in the village and achieve his
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goal, he must take on the values and "rigid habits" of the
Castle.

It is in this sense that K. can be seen as an ex-

ample of the first stage, or metamorphoses, of Nietzsche's
overman--the camel:
Like a camel, he kneels down and lets himself be
well loaded. Especially the strong, reverent
spirit that would bear much: he loads too many
alien grave words and values on himself, and then
life seems a desert to him.97
It is highly probable that Kafka--a man so deeply influenced by existentialism via Kierkegaard--was familiar with
Nietzsche's idea of the overman and Thus Spoke Zarathustra,
which was extremely popular in Germany during Kafka's life
time.

Walter Kaufmann is not the only critic �o compare

Nietzsche and Kafka:

Albert Camus and Eric Heller also draw

connections between the two writers.

Heller, author of The

Disinherited Mind, writes that Nietzsche is "in many respects
a legitimate spiritual ancestor of Kafka"; he also draws a
comparison between Kafka and Nietzsche's overman/superman:
If Nietzsche's Superman is the aesthetic counter
balance to the weight of the curse, then Kafka
is its chosen victim. What some of his critics
interpret as signs of religious achievement in
his later writings, is merely the all-engulfing
weariness of a Nietzschean Prometheus, which Kafka
expressed in the fourth of his Prometheus legends:
"Everyone grew weary of the meaningless affair.
The gods grew weary, the eagles grew weary, the
wound closed wearily. 98
11

Just as Nietzsche's camel is overcome with weariness when he
allows himself to be loaded with the burden of alien values,
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so Kafka's K. is overcome with weariness under the burden of
the alien values of the Castle and its village.
Nietzsche's camel is one who willingly allows the values
and burdens of an alien culture to be loaded upon himself in
order to become part of that culture.

He starts out as a

strong and reverent spirit but is soon crushed by the load of
a value system that either will not or cannot deliver what
it promises.

K. is just such a camel.

K.'s attitude at the beginning of the novel is one of
a strong, self-confident man who feels he is due respect
because of his prestigious position of Land-Surveyor that
the Castle has supposedly given to him.

When he is asked to

"quit the Count's territory " he reacts with great assurance
and indifference:
"Enough of this fooling," said K. in a markedly
quiet voice, laying himself down again and pull
ing up the blanket. "You're going a little too
far, my good fellow, and I'll have something to
say tomorrow about your conduct.
. Let me
tell you that I am the Land Surveyor whom the Count
is expecting. 11 99
After this initial encounter with the bureaucracy of the
Castle, he feels more than up to the small challenge he ex
pects from the authorities, and he is still under the illu
sion that he can get what he wants in his own way.

Like

the camel, K. willingly takes on the load of alien values,
expecting to carry them easily to his destination--the Castle.
But K.'s self-confidence and strength start to deteri
orate after his very first attempt to penetrate the Castle.
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On his first full day in the village, K. decides to walk to
the Castle, meeting the teacher along the way.

After their

conversation about the Count, K. feels
disconcerted, irritated by the conversation.
For the first time since his arrival he felt
really tired. . . . He felt irresistably drawn
to seek out new acquaintances, but each new
acquaintance only seemed to increase his weari
ness.l00
Not only is K. beginning to learn that his battle is
going to be much harder than he thought, but he soon dis
covers as he seeks out these "new acquaintances," that all
the ''respectable" people in town reject him because he is not
recognized by the Castle.

In fact, the only family in the

village who will have anything to do with K. is Barnabas'-
his messenger--family, and they are the outcasts of the vil
lage.

Kafka uses this family primarily to show what happens

to someone who refuses to submit to the values of the Castle.
Amalalia, one of Barnabas' sisters, refused to sleep with
a high ranking Castle official, Sortini, ao the entire family
was "excommunicated" from the village.
So if K. hopes to get through to the Castle, he must
accept and abide by the rules of the Castle, by the rules
of tradition.

Early in the novel, the landlady tries to ex

plain to K. why his approach will not work:
I don't deny that it's possible once in a while
to achieve something in the teeth of every rule
and tradition, I've never experienced anything
of that kind myself, but I believe there are
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precedents for it. That
tainly doesn't happen in
do it, simply by saying,
to your own opinions and
meant advice.101

may well be, but it cer
the way you're trying to
"no, no, 11 and sticking
flouting the most well�

With each futile attempt to get his case dealt with, K.
learns how true the landlady's advice was.

At every junc

ture in his quest, K. is blocked by either the bureaucracy
of the Castle, petty officials, his assistants, or even his
fiancee, Frieda.

K. 's weariness and fatigue increase with

every fruitless attempt to gain access and sanction from the
Castle.

When he is finally granted an interview with an

official, Erlanger, he is so overcome with fatigue that he
stumbles into the wrong room, meeting the wrong official,
Burgel.

For some unexplained reason, because he is caught

by surprise and unprepared by K., Burgel is placed:
. . . in a situation in which it very soon becomes
impossible to refuse to do a favor, . . . la-I de
fenseless position in which one sits here waiting
for the applicant to utter his plea and knowing
102
that once it is uttered one must grant it, .
K. is now in the perfect position to realize his ulti
mate goal, to be recognized and sanctioned by the Castle so
that he will be accepted in the village:
is speak up.

all he has to do

But K. is so overcome with fatigue that all he

can do is fall asleep, missing his prime opportunity.

Later,

K. is painfully
aware that his weariness had today done him more
harm than all the unfavorableness of circumstan
ces, but why could he, who had believed he could
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rely on his body and who would never have
started out on his way without that conviction,
why could he not endure a few bad nights and
one sleepless night, why did he become so un
manageably tired . . • ? 103
Like Nietzsche's camel, K. is weary because he loaded alien
values on himself; the weight of the values of the Castle is
far too much for him to bear, and K. becomes a beaten, pas
sive man following his encounter with Burgel.

Although Kaf

ka left his novel unfinished, Thomas Mann, in his "Homage"
to The Castle, tells of the account that Kafka gave to his
friends of the novel's ending:

"K. d,ies--dies out of sheer

exhaustion after his desperate efforts to get in touch with
the Castle and be confirmed in his appointment."
·K.--the camel--is finally crushed by the weight of the
alien values he loaded upon himself.

Because of his desire

for and obsession with gaining divine sanction from the
Castle so that he will be accepted in the village as the Land
Surveyor, he willingly burdens himself with their values,
only to be destroyed by the value system he hoped would "save"
him.

This is what Nietzsche expects will happen to one who

loads himself with alien--in this case, Judeo/Christian-
values, but he sees this as a necessary stage or metamorphosis
on the path towards the overman.

The second step on this

path is the "lion" stage, which Albert Camus personifies in
his allegory, The Plague.
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Camus and the Lion

-- In the lonelie-0t de-0ekt, howevek,
the �eeond metamokpho-0i-0 oeeuk-0: heke
the �pikit beeome-0 a lion who would
eonquek hi-0 6�eedom and be ma-0tek in
hi-0 own de-0ekt. Heke he -0eek-0 out hi-0
l�-0t ma-0tek: he want-0 to 6ight him and
h�-0 la-0t god; 6ok ultimate vietoky he
want� to 6ight with the gkeat dkagon. -�
Nietzsche's Zarathustra
Camus is clearly not an advocate of a traditional Chris
tian value system like Spenser's; Henri Peyre, in his essay
Camus the Pagan, states that
Camus is profoundly opposed to all Christianity
stands for: first the notions of incarnation, of
grace, of redemption, of repentance, and of col
lective guilt for some sin committed, unbeknown
to us. 1 04
The quote in the previous chapter concerning Camus' use of
astral imagery also indicates that Camus did not accept an
extrinsic value system such as Christianity:

man must face

the "indifference of the sky" without the hope that something
outside the labyrinth will give his values sanction.
Camus' antagonism towards Christian reasoning like Pane
loux offers in his two sermons again shows how he feels about
Christianity and the explanations it provides.

The only time

Rieux loses his composure in The Plague is when he confronts
Paneloux and his Christian explanation of the reason for the
plague, which is that man deserves his suffering because he
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is disobedient to God:
'Ah!

"Rieux swung round on him fiercely.

That child, anyhow, was innocent, and you know it as

well as I do!

,., lOS

The child is M. Othon's son who has just

died from the plague.
If Camus does not rely on Christianity for the basis of
his value system then what does he use?

Peyre cites Camus

as one "who attempted to derive the logical consequences
from the Nietzschean death of God.11 106

Since many critics-

including Germaine Bree, Lev Braum, and Adele King--draw the
connection between Camus and Nietzsche, a representative
quote from Walter Kaufmann will suffice to confirm this con
nection:
. Camus's Notebooks are studded with references
and quotations from Nietzsche, including a great
many from Twilight of the Idols. He once jotted
down as a chapter heading, "We Nietzscheans,"
and he was certainly very much influenced by
Nietzsche.1 0 7
Along with the numerous references to Nietzsche in his
Notebooks, Camus devotes an entire chapter of his philosophi
cal essay, The Rebel, to Nietzsche and his central axiom con
cerning the death of God:
With him I Nietzsche-I rebellion begins with "God is
dead," which is assumed as an establis.hed fact;
. Nietzsche did not form a project to kill God.
He found him dead in the soul of his contempo
raries. He was the first to understand the immense
importance of the event and to decide that this
rebellion on the part of man could not lead to a
renaissance unless it was controlled and directed.108
Later in the same essay Camus states, "We must be the advo-
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cates of Nietzsche," and Camus had the same desire as Nietzsche
to direct this rebellion against the traditional value system
by an active resistance towards Christianity and its explana
tions.
If we interpret the allegory of The Plague in light of
this attitude of active rebellion against the traditional
Christian value system, then we begin to get an idea of how
Camus'

"Rebel" should react towards the senseless "evil"--

which the plague represents--in his world, his labyrinth.
But first, we need to examine the Christian reaction to the
plague which Camus' rebel will react against.
Father Paneloux personifies the Christian reaction to
and explanation of the plague; he sets the tone for his first
sermon during the epidemic in "emphatic tones:

'Calamity has

come on you, my brethren, and, my brethren, you deserve it,'
II

109

The citizens of Oran deserve the plague because

they have sinned against God.

Paneloux explains that God

sent the plague as both a punishment and as a sign of his
"love."

The plague shows God's love because it will chastize

them in a way that will cause them to return to him:
And thus, my brothers, at last it is revealed to
you, the divine compassion which has ordained
good and evil in everything; wrath and pity; the
plague and your salvation. This same pestilence
which is slaying you works for your good and
points your path.110
Camus' rebel refuses to accept this explanation; instead, he
chooses to call evil what it is--evil--and fight the plague
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in another way, with another explanation.
It is in this sense that Camus' The Plague can be seen
as exemplifying Nietzsche's ''lion" stage of the overman.
Nietzsche says that the lion wants to fight the "great
dragon," which does not symbolize the evil, Satanic force
like it does in The Faerie Queene; as usual, Nietzsche re
verses the symbolic meaning of the dragon, aiming it right
back at the Christian value system:
Values, thousands of years old, shine on these
scales; and thus speaks the mightiest of all
dragons:
"All value of all things shines on me.
All value has long been created, and I am all
created value. 111
11

This dragon that the lion seeks to do battle with is the
creator of the old value system and the extrinsic reference
point from which all traditional values stem:
Christian God.

the Judeo

Camus' opposition to this type of value system

has already been pointed out, so all that needs be done is
see how he works this out in his allegory The Plague.
Camus shied away from creating one central hero--one
lion--in The Plague because he was far too realistic to expect one man to be a total hero or overman.

I contend that

Camus uses four principal agents in his novel to personify
the lion hero:

Grand, Rambert, Tarrou, and Rieux.

Each of

these men embody different attributes of the hero that seeks
a solution other than the Christian explanation for dealing
with the plague and what it represents, so a brief look at
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each of these characters will produce a composite sketch of
the second stage of Nietzsche's overman--the lion.
Joseph Grand--the man obsessed with writing the perfect
novel who never gets past the first sentence--is signified
by Rieux as the "hero" of his narrative because he "had to
his credit only a little goodness of heart and a seemingly
absurd ideal.11

1 12

Why would Rieux pick a "man of about fifty

years of age, tall and drooping, with narrow shoulders, thin
limbs, and a yellowish mustache" as his lion hero?

113

Pre

cisely because Grand is one of the few human beings that has
his values and desires centered around this life and man
instead of an abstract ideal.

Through Rieux, Camus makes

his admiration for this type of man evident:
Rieux was thinking it was only right that those
whose desires are limited to man and his humble
yet formidable love should enter, if only now and
then, into their reward. 114
Camus also shows his respect for men like Grand by
making him the first to recover fully from the Plague, leav
ing Rieux "Completely baffled by this 'resurrection.111

11 5

The final scene with Grand in the novel is when he says good
bye to Rieux, and tells him that he made a "fresh start" on
the first sentence of his novel:
adjectives.'

"'I've cut out all the

And, with a twinkle in his eye, he took his

hat off, bringing it low in a courtly sweep.11

11 6

Raymond Rambert--the visiting journalist who is trapped
in Oran by the plague--is in many ways the opposite of Grand:
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he is "short, square shouldered, with a determined-looking
face and keen, intelligent eyes,

He is also able

to come straight to the point whenever he has something to
say, which is quite different from Grand's inability to find
his words.
His only desire is to escape plague-stricken Oran and
return to Paris and the woman he deeply loves.

At first he

is unable to escape Oran, but when he finally succeeds in
making arrangements to escape, he realizes he belongs in Oran
fighting the plague.

When he tells Rieux of his decision to

stay and do battle with the plague, Rieux replies that "there
was nothing shameful in preferring happiness."

Although

Rambert agrees he feels that "it might be shameful to be
.
happy by oneself."118 This attitude is exactly what makes
Rambert one of Camus' lion heroes:

he, like Grand, has his

values in this world, especially in his love for his fiancee,
but he knows that this love would never be fulfilling or com
plete if he left his fellow-man in a state of suffering
Also like Grand, Rambert is allowed to enter into his reward
when he is reunited with his fiancee after the plague finishes
with the town.
Jean Tarrou is another visitor to the town of Oran,
and it is through his actions and his diary that we see a
third aspect of Camus' lion hero.

Rieux describes him as

looking "like a big grey bear,11 119 and his only concern ''is
acquiring peace of mind.11 120
In a lengthy conversation with Rieux, Tarrou reveals
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that his father was a lawyer who was instrumental in imposing
the death penalty on criminals.

This so horrified Tarrou

that he ran away from home and dedicated his life to fighting
the death penalty.

First he joined a social resistance group

but soon realized that they too imposed the death penalty.
If Tarrou is ever to gain the peace of mind he desires, he
must walk "The path of sympathy," and avoid condemning any
one to death.

12 1

Tarrou knows that his fight against the death penalty
and his fight against the plague are one and the same:

he

must fight evil, be it human or natural, that senselessly
puts men to death.

Through this fight Tarrou hopes to become

a saint, but when Rieux reminds him that he does not believe
in God, he replies:

"Exactly!

Can one be a saint without

God!--that's the problem, in fact the only problem, I'm up
agains
.
t today.
lion hero:

,, 122

Here we have another aspect of Camus'

to love and fight for man without relying on the

rewards of God for motivation--to become a saint without God,
without anything beyond the labyrinth.
Bernard Rieux--the doctor and, it turns out, the narra
tor of the novel--is the fourth example of Camus' lion hero.
When Rambert first encounters the doctor, he wants some in
formation on the sanitary conditions among the Arab popula
tion of Oran.

But Rieux refuses to give any information

unless Rambert will publish a complete condemnation of the
conditions because he will accept nothing but the full truth.
When Rambert replies, "You talk the language of Saint-Just,"
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Rieux thinks to himself:
The language he used was that of a man who was
sick and tired of the world he lived in--though
he had much liking for his fellow men--and had
resolved, for his part, to have no truck with
injustice and compromises with the truth.123
His desire for complete honesty and his commitment to helping
his fellow citizens during the epidemic are the elements of
his lion-like heroism, and, like Grand, Rambert, and Tarrou
he is willing to fight the plague without any hope of an
eternal reward for his service.
Rieux tells us that during the plague many "fledgling
moralists" tried to explain why the plague had come and what
course of action should be taken; the two most common were
the Christian explanation and the fatalist explanation.
The narrator of the story sums up how a lion hero will react
to the senseless evil in the world--not with words and ex
planations but with actions:
And Tarrou, Rieux, and their friends might give
one answer or another, but its conclusion was
always the same, their certitude that a fight must
be put up, in this way or that, and there must
be no bowing down. The essential thing was to
save the greatest possible number of persons from
dying and being doomed to unending separation. 1 24
To take up this battle against the plague without the hope
of reward from God in the next life is what makes these four
characters representative of Nietzsche's lion.
the dragon of the traditional

They take on

Christian value system and

its explanations of evil and win this battle because they
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fight the plague without relying on the extrinsic value
system and its explanations of evil and win this battle
because they fight the plague without relying on the extrin
sic value system that it represents:
Nonetheless, he knew that the tale he had to tell
could not be one of a final victory.
It could
only be the record of what had to be done again
in the never ending fight against terror and its
relentless onslaughts, despite their personal
afflictions, by all who, while unable to be saints
but refusing to bow down to �estilences, strive
their utmost to be healers.l 5
None of Camus' heroes become saints, but neither is Nietz
sche's lion a saint, for that, we need the third stage of his
overman--the child, which is personified in Zorba The Greek.
Kazantzakis and the Child

-- The. child �-6 �nnocence and 6okgett�ng,
a new beginning, a game., a -6e.l6-pkopelled
whe.e.l, a 6�k-6t movement, a -6a.cked "ye.-6." -Nietzsche's Zarathustra
In his autobiography, Report to Greco, Kazantzakis tells
of how a young girl came up to him in a library in Paris with
a picture of Nietzsche, telling Kazantzakis it looked just
like him.

She was so surprised that Kazantzakis did not know

it was Nietzsche that she gave him a copy of Thus Spoke Zarathustra:

"That was one of the most decisive moments of

life," writes Kazantzakis.126
decisive this encounter was:

Levitt

points out just how
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His dissertation, completed in 1909 was on "Fried
rich Nietzsche and the Philosophy of Right"; he
translated Zarathustra and The Birth of Tragedy
into demotic Greek; he followed the path of
Nietzsche across Europe as if on a "pilgrimage"
and for years kept a deathmask of the philosopher
over the doorways to his various homes. 1 27
Andreas Poulakidas contends that Kazantzakis met the real
George Zorba while he was in the process of translating Thus
Spoke Zarathustra, and it was George Zorba who "unknowingly
converted" Nietzsche's philosophy "into flesh and blood,
into a living reality,

• Kazantzakis realized this, and

was able to develop his hero, Alexis Zorba into the
real overman that Zarathustra was seeking

"

128

This evi-

dence shows that not only was Kazantzakis very familiar with
Nietzsche's allegory, but that he also used it as a model for
his own overman:

Alexis Zorba.

This is the philosophical

ideal which Kazantzakis wanted to portray in his novel, plac
ing it within the criteria for allegory in Chapter One.

Since

the "child" stage is the final "metamorphoses" of the over
man, we can use the description of Nietzsche's overman in
Chapter Two as a comparative device to show how Kazantzakis
uses this ideal as his model for Zorba The Greek.
The child is "innocence" and a "new beginning," says
Zarathustra, and Alexis Zorba embodies both of these qualities:

"Like a child, he IzorbaJ sees everything for the

first time,11 1 29 with all the freshness and innocence of Adam.
This aspect of Zorba's nature never fails to amaze the Boss,
who understands that this

73
is how great visionaries and poets see every
thing--as if for the first time. Each morning
they see a new world before their eyes; they do
not really see it, they create it. 130
If the overman is to create a new yalue system, then he must
approach the world like Zorba, combining both innocence and
Nietzschean pride.
This pride is essential for the overman and Zorba be
cause they must be the reference point for their value systerns.

Zorba's reaction to the Boss' question, "But don't you

believe in anything?" shows that Zorba considers himself as
his reference point:
No I don't believe in anything. How many times
must I tell you that? I don't believe in anything
or anyone; only in Zorba. Not because Zorba is
better than others; not at all, not a little bit!
He's a brute like the rest! But I believe in
Zorba because he's the only being I have in my
power, the only one I know. 1 31
Zorba knows his ego is the only reference point he has, and
all his values proceed from and are derived from his will.
Remembering that Nietzsche contends that this will
created all the opposing, dualistic forces in a value system
such as Spenser's, we should see Zorba the overman fusing
together opposites like God and Satan, good and evil, heaven
and hell.

During their Easter feast, Zorba explains his

view of God to the Boss:
God enjoys himself, kills, commits injustice,
makes love, works, likes impossible things, just
the same as I do. He eats what he pleases; takes
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the woman he chooses. If you see a lovely woman
going by, . • . Suddenly the ground opens and
she disappears. Where does she go? Who takes
her? If she's a good woman, they say "God has
taken her." If she's a harlot, they say: "The
devil's carried her off." But, boss, I've said
it before, and I say it again� God and the devil
are one and the same thing! l3L
If God and the devil are one in same, there will not be an
absolute reference point to determine man's ethics.

Then

how is one to tell the difference between good and evil?
Again, the individual, as his own reference point, will decide
13 3
what good and evil mean. For Zorba good means full
because this is the only life he can be sure of living:

"The

only thing that makes any difference is whether I'm alive
or dead.

Whether the devil or God calls me . . . I shall die
134
turn in
• to a reek ing
•
corpse, and s t in
• k peopl e out . II
Zorba is, like a child, inconsistent in his view of
God--saying at one point "there's no God and no devil," but
later saying, "I can't say I do I _believe in God.J either.
can't for the life of me.11 135

I

But Zorba is not a metaphys

ician, nor does he care to be one; he is concerned only with
his immediate, existential situation:
Yet, if there is a God, I shan't be afraid to appear
before him when the time comes- I don't know how
to put it to make you understand. I don't think
any of that's important, do you see? Would God
bother to sit over the earthworms and keep count
of everything they do? And get angry and storm
and fret himself silly because one went astray
with the female earthworm next door or swallowed
a mouthful of meat on Good Friday? Bah! Get
away with you, all you soup-swilling priests!
Bah! 1 36
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The final line of this speech of Zorba's reveals his atti
tude towards the organized religion of the priests which
dictates the morals of the people with the threat of eternal
punishment.

When the Boss and Zorba visit the monastery,

Zorba is described as "suffocating" while in the building,
and as he finds out just how corrupt the priests are, he
calls them "Swine!

Liars!

Mu 1 es.I 11 137

Zorba soon discovers

that the priests shot the young monk, Demetrios, and as he
and the Boss ride away on their horses, he cries out, "Give
me your curses, Holy Fathersi

11138

Although Zorba despises the Christianity of the priests,
his attitude towards Christ himself is very different.

Dur

ing their Easter feast, Zorba exults, "Come on, let's celebrate the Resurrection, boss!
friend!
Christ;

11139

. • Christ is reborn, my

This is similar to Nietzsche's attitude towards

his attack was against the organized Christianity

of the German churches, not against Christ himself:
Mankind lies on its knees before the opposite
of that which was the origin, the meaning, the
right of the evangel; in the concept of "church"
it has pronounced holy precisely what the "bringer
of the glad tidings" felt to be beneath and behind
himself--one would look in vain for a greater
example of world-historical irony. 140
So Nietzsche's overman, like Zorba, fuses and unites together
another of the central dualisms of a value system such as
Spenser's--the distinction between Christian and non-Christian.

Zorba gives us an indication of how he perceives this

fusion when he tells the Boss what remains acceptable for

him in the Christian conception of life:

"There's something

which stays, something that's saved and turns into good humor,
dancing, singing, wrangling even--that's what I call Resur
rection.11 141
This last quote gives us a synopsis of the values Zorba
and Nietzsche's overman advocate, the first of which is "good
humor."

In a conversation with Zorba, Zaharia--the "mad,"

runaway monk--claims that
God must like fun and laughter. "Come
my little buffoon, come inside," he'll
me one day, I know. "Come and make me
That's the way I'll get into Paradise,
buffoon!

inside
say to
laugh! "
as a

When Zorba hears this, he jumps up and says, "You'v� got your
head screwed on the right way, old fellow!

11142

Zarathustra-

who said "we should call every truth false which was not accom
panied by at least one laugh 11143 --would certainly agree with
Zorba; furthermore, he asserts
What has so far been the greatest sin here on earth?
Was it not the word of him who said, "Woe unto
those who laugh here?" Did he himself find no
reasons for laughing? Then he searched very badly.
Even a child could find reasons here. 144
Zorba is just such a child because he has no problems finding
plenty to laugh about on this earth, inside this labyrinth.
Another value shared by the overman and Zorba is their
love for the dance, which in many respects symbolizes all
the values they represent and advocate.

Zarathustra will
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"believe only in a god who could dance," and Zerba swears
145
"the gods and devils must talk to each other" by dancing.
Both Nietzsche and Kazantzakis use the image of the dionysian
dance to characterize their heroes as being overcome by the
rapture of excessive joy and laughter, and this spirit of
excess is one of the highest values in both writer's value
systems.

When Zorba totally exhausts himself in a dance, the

Boss asks what made him do it:
joy was choking me.

"What could I do Boss?

I had to find some outlet.11

philosophy of excess, of "no half-measures,"

147

146

My

This

is what Zara-

thustra says will kill the ''spirit of gravity," which is his
arch-enemy and devil.
Since this value of excess is the opposite of Chris
tian value of temperance--personified by Sir Guyon in Spen
ser's The Faerie Queene--we can conclude that Nietzsche's
overman, his child, and Alexis Zorba, Kazantzakis' child,
create a new value system, a "new beginning."

This system is

not based on an extrinsic reference point--such as God--but
on an intrinsic reference point--the creative, willing ego of
the overman--located directly in the labyrinth instead of
outside it.

Because their values are centered around this

earth and this life, Nietzsche's overman and Ale�is Zorba
both value, above all, a life that affirms and embraces this
world in all its beauty and ugliness:
sacred "Yes" on existence.

they both proclaim a
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CONCLUSION
Friedrich Nietzsche's incisive psychological analysis
of his ''age's highest aspirations" is, in many ways, the
most complete diagnosis of the profound shift in the values
of Western Culture.

Reacting to Darwin's conclusion that

man is a natural rather than divine creation, Nietzsche
advocated a new value system based on loyalty to the earth
to replace the old value system based on loyalty to heaven.
The infuluence of Nietzsche's philosophy of value extends
deeply into most fields of modern, humanistic thought:

in

philosophy, Heidegger and Sartre--in theology, Buber and
Tillich--in ·psychology, Freud and Jung--and, as this thesis
sought to prove, in literature, Kafka, Camus, and Kazantza
kis.
These last three authors have each written an example
of a modern allegory (The Castle, The Plague, and Zorba The
Greek) which I have interpreted as personifying the three
developmental stages of Nietzsche's overman.

If these three

works represent attempts by man to learn to live in his
world--his labyrinth--without the consolation and hope of
an after-life or an extrinsic sanction for his values, then
I offer these generalizations.
Kafka--the ''camel"--depicts man caught in a power
struggle with the prevailing value system of his culture.
K. is required to load himself with the burden of the
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Castle's values if he wants to be accepted in the culture-
the village.

Yet he soon realizes that the values of the

Castle are not effective when he is forced to deal with the
reality of his present, existential situation.

K. is an

allegorical example of a modern man who seeks sanction for
his actions and values outside the labyrinth:

after load

ing alien values on himself like Nietzsche's camel, K. dies
as a result of his futile attempts to gain recognition from
the Castle--which represents the divine, heavenly realm.
In The Plague, Camus portrays the overman in the "lion"
stage, fighting with the evil of the plague and with the
Christian explanation for it.

His four main characters-

Rieux, Tarrou, Rambert, and Grand--all choose to fight the
plague without the hope of a reward in the after-life.

Un

like Father Paneloux, who seeks an explanation for the evil
of the plague in a source outside the labyrinth, these men
are willing to face the evil within the labyrinth without
an explanation or justification from an extrinsic, external
source--like God.
Kazantzakis uses his character, Zorba, to personify
the overman in the final stage of development--the "child."
In this stage, man has learned how to embrace his world in
all of its paradoxical beauty.

Like Nietzsche's child,

Zorba fuses together the dualistic opposites--God and Devil,
Heaven and Hell, Good and Evil--of the Christian value system
to create his own values that allow him to accept and love
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his labyrinthian world without an extrinsic sanction for his
values.
Following in Nietzsche's path, Kafka, Camus, and Kaz
antzakis all reject Christian, teleological values in favor
of Existential, humanistic values.

Like Nietzsche, the em

phasis of their value system is on man and bis reaction to
the realization that there is nothing beyond the labyrinth.
These three modern writers portray the abstract ideal of
Nietzsche's overman in the narrative lines of their novels,
synthesizing the two levels of meaning necessary for alle
gorical literature, and synthesizing the two primary threads
of this thesis:

allegory and value.
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